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ECONOMIC POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
SUSTAINABILITY: A SECOND LOOK AT MARKETABLE OR TRADEABLE 
POLLUTION OR ENVIRONMENTAL - USE PERMITS 
 
 
Abstract 
There has been a recent tendency to extol tradeable or marketable pollution permits or similar 
permits to use or exploit some natural resources, such as fish.   They are often seen as a very 
effective way of maintaining environmental conditions in a desired way.   However, considerable 
care is required in adopting such systems.   If they are inappropriately designed, the government 
will lose its flexibility to control the state of the environment.   Permits which give their owners 
absolute rights to emit certain quantities of pollution in perpetuity or entitle holders to use or 
appropriate a particular quantity of a natural resource in perpetuity can cause particular problems 
for government.   They can for example, involve expensive buy-back schemes.   There are, 
however, ways around the problem.   Furthermore, holders or rights may have to pay fees to 
cover enforcement costs.   Where tradeable permits have a very long-life,  the question arises of 
how they should be allocated and whether those allocated these rights should be allowed to 
capture the rents.   As discussed, changing ambient conditions may have to be allowed for in 
designing systems involving tradeable permits. 
 
1. Introduction 
The introduction of marketable environmental-use rights, such as pollution rights, are considered 
by many to be an efficient way of satisfying environmental standards e.g., air and water quality 
standards, or of achieving sustainable use of natural resources, such as fish stocks, to which there 
is some degree of common access.   It is frequently argued that they result in environmental 
standards or targets being met at minimum cost because the market will ensure that rights to use 
the environment are distributed between users so that the marginal net benefit of each from this 
use is equal (Dales, 1968).   Consequently, social benefits from use of the environment are 
maximised relative to the aggregate environmental use permitted. 
 
In principle, a similar result could be obtained by the introduction of suitable taxes or 
government charges on the use of the natural environment (Dales, 1968; Tisdell, 1993 a, Ch. 4).  
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However, it is not easy to predict the level of tax or user-charges necessary to achieve a 
particular degree of use of the environment or to achieve an environmental standard.  Marketable 
rights or quotas are advantageous in that regard (Pearce and Turner, 1990; Tisdell, 1993 b).  
Secondly in order to meet the environmental targets set, taxes or charges need to be altered with 
changing conditions.   Politically and administratively this is not easy.  Consequently,  they tend 
to be “sticky”.   On the other hand, the price of marketable pollution permits automatically 
changes  as the demand for these alters.  Nevertheless, marketable environmental-use rights have 
been subjected to substantial criticism as a means of environmental regulation (Livingston et al., 
1996; Russell and Powell, 1996; Sterner, 1994). 
 
2. Political Aspects 
Politically it is easier in most cases to introduce marketable environmental-use rights than taxes 
or government charges on environmental use.   This is so provided that ‘grandfathering’ is used 
to distribute rights.   In this case the rights are distributed to those already involved in use of the 
environmental resource in question usually in proportion to their use at no charge or at a nominal 
charge.   Consequently, any rents from rights to use the resource are captured by the existing 
users and there is little or no income transfer to the government.   This reduces political 
opposition from environmental users such as producers.   However, the question of whether such 
a distribution of property rights is just remains unresolved. 
 
Rents from use of environmental resources   in a system of marketable environmental-use rights 
need not be captured by the original users of the environment.   Whether they are depends on 
how the system for such rights is designed and operated.   If for example, rights are not in 
perpetuity but are auctioned say each year by the government then the government would capture 
the rents.   However such a system is likely to be unpopular with existing environmental users.  
There are a variety of different possible schemes involving marketable rights to use the 
environment.   They have different consequences for income distribution, economic efficiency 
and flexibility of policy and this aspect will be discussed below. 
 
 
3. Marketability of Rights 
If marketable pollution or environmental-use rights are to achieve the efficiency benefits 
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ascribed to them, then the market in such rights needs to be relatively competitive. In practice  
markets in these rights tend to be “thin” because there may be few holders of such rights 
particularly if rights are differentiated by region (see below). 
 
Sale of rights can also be used to restrict competition and new entry.   If rights are held by those 
already in an industry, they may retain them as a way of restricting new entrants.   Supply in an 
industry could also be restricted by one or a few firms cornering environmental-use rights. 
 
4. Enforcement and Agency Costs, Allocation of Rights 
If a system of marketable environmental-use permits is to be effective, it is necessary to ensure 
that only those who have permits use the environment in question and do so only to the extent 
allowed by their permits.   Failure to enforce the rules of the system can be expected to result in 
increasing violations and a breakdown of  control.   How does one ensure compliance?    
 
One possibility is to allow permit-holders to sue violators for damages.   This will however 
involve costs and legal uncertainty for any permit-holder bringing a court action against a 
violator and other permit-holders may free ride  on the litigant.    The system may therefore not 
result in sufficient enforcement to protect property rights through permits and to achieve 
environmental targets.   Consequently, the government or an agency of the government may be 
called upon to enforce the regulations. 
 
Considerable costs of enforcement may be incurred by the agency.   It may for example have to 
keep a register  of rights including transfers, and guard against the issue of fraudulent 
certificates.   It will also need to monitor compliance and take legal action against violators.   The 
question arises of who should pay for those costs and how.   A common practice is to impose a 
levy on permit-holders and a fee on transfers to meet such costs.   Thus the user appears to pay 
although the full incidence of these charges may not fall on permit-holders because they may be 
passed on to some extent to others further along the economic chain e.g., the buyers of the 
commodities of permit-holders.        
Ideally the enforcement agency should minimise its costs for the degree of enforcement 
achieved.  However, it may fail to do so.   In fact, like many public agencies, it may try to 
maximise its budget, although possible criticism from permit-holders may curb its behaviour in 
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this respect.  Nevertheless, its goal may be to maximise its budget subject to account being taken 
of the possible political pressures generated. 
 
Another possible institutional means for obtaining compliance is co-management (Pomeroy, 
1994).   This approach  involves  the government agency and those involved in the use of the 
environment in co-operating to draw up and ensure enforcement of environmental regulations.  
This can have a number of advantages.   It improves information flows between the parties 
involved and can reduce enforcement costs (Kuperan and Sutinen, 1996).   On the other hand, 
there are circumstances in which it would give rise to socially unacceptable results.   This may 
occur when all relevant interest groups are not involved in the management of environmental 
use.   For instance if co-management only involves members of the public service and permit-
holders, those damaged by pollution are unrepresented.  At least this is so if only permit-holders 
are polluters. 
 
Note that it is sometimes considered to be an advantage of a system of tradeable pollution or 
environmental use-permits, that those who wish to prevent the activity can buy permits and 
withhold these from the market and from use.   This action will be effective provided that it is 
not counteracted by an increased issue of permits by the government.   The latter is always a 
political possibility.   Secondly, benefits from environmental conservation are often greatly 
diffused and can be relatively small for each individual.   No or few conservationists might find 
it worthwhile to buy environmental-use permits for withholding purposes, even though 
collectively it may be worthwhile for them to do so.   Because of free riding and the cost of 
organising collective action to buy environmental-use permits for withholding purposes, it is 
unlikely to occur.  Thus the system is not fully effective in achieving conservation goals. 
 
The buy-back proposed for conservationists  also raises the question of justice.   Should 
environmental-user rights be given to conservationists in which case those wishing to use the 
environment would need to purchase rights from conservationists or should those permits be 
allocated to users of the environment, or should the initial allocation involve an allocation to both 
parties.   Despite the suggestion of Coase (1960),  environmental use is likely to vary with the 
initial allocation of rights to use of the environment (Tisdell, 1991, p. 136).  In addition, the 
nature of this allocation  affects the distribution of incomes in very different ways. 
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5. Locational Factors and Environmental Rights 
The sustainable level of environmental use or the socially optimal  level of environmental use 
can vary from region to region.   Thus different levels of environmental control may have to be 
executed in different regions and this calls for variation and differentiation in environmental-use 
rights by location (Tietenberg, 1974).   Furthermore, this can be expected to result in variations 
in the market price of pollution rights between regions.   Thus regional diffentiation in  pollution 
rights in Southern California results in permits for air pollution rights having a higher price in 
coastal areas than inland.   Because the prevailing winds blow from the sea more damage is done 
by air pollutants originating near the coast in Southern California than by those emitted further 
inland.  Similarly, it is possible that water pollutants originating upstream may do more 
environmental damage than those released near the mouth of a river. 
 
While regional differences in rights to use the environment are often necessary, one problem in 
the case of marketable permits is that this reduces the breadth of markets for rights because it 
creates regional submarkets.   This can affect market competition for such rights and make it 
easier to corner rights in some regions.   Ownership of rights can be used as a barrier to entry of 
new regional competitors or in certain cases as a means to restrict regional supplies. 
 
In some cases, regional rights to use the environment need to be varied seasonally e.g., 
depending on the seasonal direction of prevailing wind flows or water currents.   In principle, 
environmental-use rights can be designed to take seasonal variation into account. 
 
6. Duration of Environmental - Use Rights and their Nature 
Transferable environmental-use rights can vary significantly in their direction and in their nature. 
 The following are some of the possibilities: 
 
(i)  The permit-holder has the right in perpetuity to use the environment to a fixed absolute 
extent e.g., the right to a specified absolute catch of a fish species annually, rights to emit 
a particular quantity of pollutants per year. 
 
(ii) Rights may be as above but for a finite period e.g., for one year or for five years. 
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(iii) The rights may be in perpetuity but only for a fixed proportionate level of use of the 
environment, e.g., rights to emit a fixed proportion of the total or aggregate level of 
emissions of a pollutant allowed in each period of time for instance a year, rights to a 
fixed proportion of the total allowable catch of a species.   This method is used for 
example to allocate rights to catch southern bluefin tuna in Australian waters. 
 
(iv) Another possibility is for the above rights not to be in perpetuity but for finite duration. 
 
(v) Still another possibility is for the above absolute or relative rights to be discounted or 
diminished in a regular fashion with the passage of time.   For example, 10 percent of 
rights per year may have to be surrendered to the government.   The government could 
re-issue these or it may decide not to do so or only re-issue a portion of the surrendered 
rights.   A system of this type was proposed at one time for permits for amateur 
fishermen in New South Wales. 
 
(vi) In some cases, rights may be restricted in terms of their transferability e.g., they may be 
restricted to use in a particular region or regions. 
 
(vii) The method by which permits are issued or re-issued can vary.   For instance, their issue 
could be by open tender or auctioning with a variety of conditions applying or they may 
be allocated administratively taking into account pre-existing use of the environment by 
the parties concerned. 
 
From the above, it should be clear that a large range and complex set of possibilities exist for 
systems of transferable or tradeable environmental-use permits.  Differences in these systems are 
liable to have different implications for economic efficiency and for the impact generally of 
environmental regulation.  Take case (i) above, absolute rights in perpetuity.   This provides 
considerable security to permit-holders but provides the regulator with virtually no flexibility.  
This can create difficulties.   For example, suppose that after the absolute rights are issued  it 
becomes clear that the aggregate level of environmental-use allocated is unsustainable or not 
optimal and needs to be reduced.   Given the nature of the rights,  this can only be achieved by 
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the government buying back rights which can be expensive.   This is not just a hypothetical 
possibility.  The New Zealand Government in a bold experiment introduced such a system for 
some of its fisheries.   Subsequently, it was found that the total allowable catch for some species 
exceeded the level that was sustainable.   The Government therefore,  at considerable expense to 
New Zealand taxpayers, purchased back some of the rights and did not re-issue these. 
 
Schemes of shorter duration or in which rights ‘depreciate’ or are discounted with the passage of 
time provide environmental regulators with more flexibility but create greater uncertainty for 
users of the environment.   In practice a compromise between security of rights for 
environmental users and the need for some flexibility in regulation needs to be reached.   
Systems of marketable permits should be designed with this in mind.   In doing this,  it is 
important to bear in mind that businesses may have to make long-term investments to curtail 
pollution efficiently or limit their use of the environment.  The greater the degree of uncertainty 
about allowable future environmental use, the less likely businesses are to commit themselves to 
 investments reducing environmental degradation because they need to retain flexibility as a 
hedge against uncertainty. 
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7. Ambience 
In many cases, the impact of use of the environment depends upon ambient conditions.   Since 
these can often vary considerably, ideally permitted use of the environment should be altered as 
their conditions change.  However, the transaction costs of such variations can be high and they 
may be so high that it is not worthwhile trying to achieve the absolute ideal. 
 
Where it is not practical to vary user rights as ambient conditions alter, the level of use allowed 
by the permits may have to be adjusted to take this into account.   Thus, if for example, there is 
expected to be a period of the year when ambient conditions are expected to be such that air 
pollutants cause much greater environmental damage than usual, rights to emit air pollutants may 
be curtailed more than otherwise for the whole period in which the rights apply.   This is the 
most likely approach when the period of environmentally dangerous ambient conditions is 
uncertain and variable. 
 
If this period is relatively certain, for example, occurs in the summer season only, then the rights 
to use the environment can be specified in a regularly varying manner.   For example, users of 
the environment may be issued with permits to emit a specified quantity of air pollutants per 
month but the quantity allowed in the summer period may be 20 percent less than in the 
remainder of the year.   Other possibilities also exist e.g., the 20 percent reduction applies only 
when this is announced in advance by the regulator. 
 
8. Concluding Comment 
Some writers extol the virtues of marketable environmental-use rights in comparison to other 
means to control the use of the environment.   Their argument is usually based on highly 
simplified models and situations.   In particular, they give insufficient consideration to the 
complexities of systems of marketable rights to use the environment and the possible diversity of 
such systems.   There is a need to give much more attention to the varied possibilities for such 
permit systems and the consequences of different types of these systems.   Otherwise, little 
practical progress will be made in devising effective and efficient policies for environmental 
management. 
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